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Abstract 
Today, there are millions of surveillance cameras monitoring and recording day to day activities of people in the sake of safety
and security of general public. However, like double-edged sword, there are both pros and cons when using such technology to 
protect people. Some of the advantages like detecting abnormal behaviors, identifying theft attempts of evidence for crime scene, 
etc., are overrun by the abilities of abusing the same technology in several ways due to the miniaturization and lack of limits or 
controls on their use. Especially miniaturization with latest technological development has enabled setting and hiding those 
cameras beyond the imaginations. Therefore in this paper we proposed a method to protect people from monitoring and recording 
their behaviors without consent and control illegal usage while enabling a method to distinguish legal cameras from fake. 
© 2009 Published by Elsevier Ltd.
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1. Introduction 
Video cameras and closed-circuit televisions (CCTV) are becoming a more and more widespread feature of daily 
life in everywhere. Major cities in England, Japan, China and America are almost full of such cameras (Frdric et al., 
2006). Recently, Japan started deploying surveillance cameras even inside the train compartments. Fears rose 
against terrorism and the availability of ever-cheaper cameras have accelerated the trend even more. Though the 
basic idea is to have the cameras as an information-gathering tool and a device to collect evidence when crimes 
occurs,  the use of sophisticated systems and their proliferations across the cities in past several years by police and 
other public security officials are particularly troubling in a democratic society (Electronic Privacy Information 
Center, 2009). 
In the past, surveillance equipment was only used by the government and private investigators. But now more 
and more people are finding a need for this specialized equipment. Since the new surveillance technologies are 
smaller and more powerful, allow many more kinds of information to be collected, stored and connected together, 
and operate more instantaneously, controlling of their usage have become very difficult. As for now, this technology 
is being used by government looking at people, establishments looking at people, establishments looking at 
establishments or people looking at people, people looking at establishments, and people looking at government. For 
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the same reason, hidden surveillance cameras have become very popular to monitor homes and businesses 
everywhere. Part of their popularity stems from the fact that they're small. They don't take a lot of space, they're 
easy to hide, and the equipment more affordable than many other security methods (D. Chen et al., 2007). 
However, video surveillance is a double-edged sword that can be used for good and bad. What is difficult is to 
control and eliminate the misuse of them as most new technologies do. Therefore we have to look for ways to use it 
well, without compromising our integrity. Then the questions like “Do we own our motions?”, “Do we have a right 
to know what happens to our motions, and how this information is processed and used?”, “Should we be concerned 
with what's connected to an intelligent motion detector, or should we just place absolute trust in authority?”, etc. are 
raised by people (Lioudakis et al., 2007). 
Though there are several restrictions on mobile phone cameras and audio recordings (Cranor et al., 2002), there 
are not enough laws to prevent people from capturing their actions and motions using hidden surveillance cameras. 
Using hidden surveillance cameras mainly threaten the personal privacy though it helps protecting safety and 
security (Wickramasuri et al., 2004). 
Widespread deployments of hidden surveillance camera systems have raised apprehension on their threat to 
individuals’ right of privacy. Furthermore, miniaturization and improvement of camera technology like enabling 180 
degrees visibility through a small pinhole, and deliver digital video with 1024-line resolution comparable to HDTV, 
even wirelessly made the protecting privacy a very difficult task (Paruchuri et al., 2008). 
Most security experts tell us that hidden cameras are best. After all, except for petty crimes like shop-lifting, 
cameras out in the open don't prevent crime. Instead, they invite vandalism. So, crime prevention isn't the reason we 
use surveillance cameras. It's important to remember that the great value in using hidden surveillance cameras is not 
preventing crime. It's catching criminals and retrieving stolen property. And if you don't record the images you 
capture, they're not good for law enforcement either. On the other hand, we are being monitored by the criminals 
who are constantly looking for opportunities to attack us (Lindell et al., 2002). 
Further, the use of private hidden surveillance cameras has not been clearly decided by the courts (Solove, 2008). 
Therefore, industries are rapidly growing to produce and supply with smaller cameras. The very miniaturization has 
made it possible for police to hide cameras in shopping-mall washrooms has also made camcorders small and light 
enough for average citizens to carry around and capture events. Thus miniaturization has turned the technology into 
an equalizer rather than an oppressor.  
The causes for the above problem emphasize two main reasons. They are the abuse of surveillance camera 
system and lack of limits or controls over their use. The abuse can be categorized as criminal purpose, institutional 
purpose, personal purpose, discriminatory targeting, and voyeurism whereas the other main reason is the lack of 
limits or controls on camera use (Solove, 2008). According to our knowledge, to enforce the rules and regulations 
on surveillance cameras, there is no supportive technology provided by manufactures. Thus preventing privacy 
invasions by well-established rules like in mobile phone cameras has become extremely difficult. In this paper, we 
proposed a method to protect people from monitoring and recording their behaviors without consent and control 
illegal usage while enabling a method to distinguish legal cameras from fake. Our proposed method also improves 
the lifecycle stages of a camera from production to recycling. 
2. Proposed Solution 
After analyzing the causes which create the above problem, we could discover that embedding each camera with 
a rich type of passive radio frequency IC chip at the time of manufacturing can opened up ways to solve it. 
Therefore, as of our previous research work, we could identify that designing a tag adhering to the object orient 
concepts will better solve the problem. Then we derived a tag structure called Camera OTag which inherits 
characteristics and behaviors of OTag (Sabaragamu Koralalage et al., 2009).  
OTag is a tag that is having attributes and behaviors like in Object and has the abilities of being stand alone, self-
describing, plug and playable and interoperable. Additionally the access to the OTag is provided depending on the 
privileges of the role. In Camera OTag, there are two types of roles: public and private. When accessing information 
by public users, they are only allowed to read public information whereas the private users are allowed to read both 
private and public information using common communicational protocols using standard readers. Not only that if 
each camera is embedded with Camera OTag, several applications can be realized by using characteristics of radio 
frequency communication. 
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2.1. Schematic structure of a Camera OTag. 
Figure 1 illustrates the schematic structure of a Camera OTag. Values filled in the attributes of the Camera OTags 
are different from instance to instance. Furthermore, each attribute of the Camera OTag has got an access modifier 
to manage the access based on roles. Note that the access modifiers used here are not exactly the same as in object 
oriented concepts. Figure 1 also illustrates the memory types, access modifiers, and respective keys of each role. 
Encryption algorithm used here is AES-128 stream cipher. Therefore each key size is fixed to 128bits. No secured 
information is transmitted without sufficient authentication. Camera OTag contains methods, data “Initial”, 
encryption algorithm and processing module. Camera OTag generates nonce NI whereas the interrogator generates 
three nonce values NT, IDI and IDT to carry out proper mutual authentication. 
Access modifiers can be considered as roles and one of the two access modifiers is assigned to each attribute. 
With the help of those modifiers, Camera OTag acts two roles: public and private. Public means no security and any 
reader can read any attribute value of public area. Private attributes need secure access. Furthermore the writing 
permission is also available for these areas, but that is controlled by both secure keys and memory types. For 
instance write once memory is used for some attributes in private area to prevent updating fixed attribute values 
whereas rewritable memory is used for dynamically changing attribute values according to the behaviors of Camera 
object class. Role base accessing methods are implemented using access modifiers, memory types and encryption 
algorithms. As described in the above paragraphs, two roles of Locomotive OTag are defined here. Memory types 
used here are ROM, EPROM, and EEPROM. Details of each role definition are described in later paragraphs. Flag 
“A” describe public attributes whereas “B” describes private attributes. 
Figure 1. Illustrate the schematic structure of a Camera OTag. 
Private area stores the color, model, manufactured year, frame number, type, etc. Additionally it also has got two 
customizable attributes named as PvtAttrib01 and PvtAttrib02 for future applications. After first registration or first 
use of the Camera, rewriting or updating of attribute values in this area can only be done with the private key. 
Information stored in this area is devoted to the Camera owner. No one other than the private role owner can read or 
write data into this area. However the private owner cannot change the attributes that are not rewritable. When 
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cameras are recall or hand over for repairing, checking its availability, transferring ownership when selling or 
reselling, etc. are some of the main applications using this area. 
2.2. Communicational protocols of camera OTag 
Public area stores the object class name, type, anonymous ID, and customizable attribute called PblAttrib01. 
Information stored in this area can be used to understand object and its existence. Unlike private area, reading of any 
attribute in public area is permitted without any security. 
Camera OTag has five main communicational protocols: unsecured reading, secured reading, secured writing and 
key updating. Protocol notations are as follows.  
I – Interrogator(Reader/Writer) 
T – Tag (OTag)
Kprv - Private Key (128bits)  
PIN - Personal Identification Number (48bits)  
NI - Nonce generated by Interrogator (40bits)  
NT - Nonce generated by Tag (40bits)  
IDI  and IDT -Interrogator generated ID (16bits)  
Initial - Publicly defined initial message (16bits)  
R - Response value – Successful/Failed [1/0]  
{M}K - Message “M” encrypted by Key “K” using AES128 
2.2.1. Unsecured (public) reading protocol 
 Unsecure reading protocol is used for public reading. Any reader can query the public attribute values by passing 
the attribute name to the Camera OTag. For that attribute names of the given object class must be available for the 
reader to query the attribute value. For instance, attribute name list of Camera class should be available with the 
interested readers. When an interested reader queries “Type” attribute value from Camera OTag, the tag will answer 





2.2.2. Secured reading protocol 
Private role attribute values should be managed securely. Reading is allowed only after successful mutual 
authentication. Here the Kprv denotes the Encryption key used in each party. Reading is only granted for authorized 
parties and they can only read the data which belong to them. To ensure security of each reading messages are 
encrypted with authorization key and send.  
IÆT: oName=?  
TÆI: oName=“ CAMERA”  
IÆT: Initial{Initial, NI, IDI, IDT} Kprv
TÆI: IDI { IDT, NI, NT} Kprv
IÆT: IDT { IDT, NT,0, AttribName=“color”} Kprv
TÆI: IDI { NI, IDT, R=“WHITE”} Kprv
2.2.3. Secured writing protocol  
Same as in the secure reading, the secured writing needs successful mutual authentication. Attribute name and 
attribute value pair should be passed for each writings. After successful writing, interrogator will be acknowledged. 
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IÆT: oName=?  
TÆI: oName=“ CAMERA”  
IÆT: Initial{Initial, NI, IDI, IDT } Kprv
TÆI: IDI { IDT, NI, NT } Kprv
IÆT: IDT { IDT, NT,0, AttribName=“inspectionExpire”, R=“090515”} Kprv
TÆI: IDI { NI, IDT, R=“0/1”} Kprv
2.2.4. Secured key update protocol 
Key update can only be carry out by the private role owner. Unlike secured writing, reconfirmation is necessary 
here before actual key update as the communication will be no longer possible if a wrong key is set. Therefore, there 
are two more passes in this protocol other than secure writing. Here the KN means the new key to be used for 
encryption. 
IÆT: oName=?  
TÆI: oName=“ CAMERA”  
IÆT: Initial{Initial, NI, IDI, IDT } Kprv
TÆI: IDI { IDT, NI, NT } Kprv
IÆT: IDT{ IDT, NT,1,AttribName=“prvKy”, R=“KN”} Kprv
TÆI: IDI { IDI, AttribName=“prvKy”, R=“KN”} Kprv
IÆT: IDT { IDT, Confirm=“0/1”} Kprv
TÆI: IDT { NI, IDI, R=“0/1”} Kprv
3. Discussion on Possible Applications of Camera OTag 
There are several possible applications that can be achieved due to embedding a Camera OTag in each 
surveillance camera. Improve efficiency throughout the cameras life cycle stages, expressing the presence of a 
working camera, retrieving availability of installed camera count in a given area, detecting illegally installed camera, 
identifying initial purpose of the camera, prevent setting cameras in not-allowed places are some of the main 
applications of proposed solution. Since Camera OTag is a passive tag which does not need any battery source and 
can be implemented in a size of grain, installing such a tag does not need unnecessary space. Similarly to protect 
making frauds, Camera OTag can be embedded inside the camera circuit in way to protect its removal and damage. 
3.1. Improve efficiency throughout the cameras life cycle stages 
Since the Camera OTag will be embedded by the time of manufacturing, it can be used throughout the supply 
chain management up to retail store. Not only that, same tag can be used even after purchase. Camera OTag can be 
used to prove the purchase, claim for guaranteed services, electronic ownership transfer, etc.  
There are two main purposes of buying cameras, one is for personal use and the other is for public safety. 
Customer has to select either one at the time of purchase. If one customer wants to buy camera for the purpose of 
public safety, they have to produce enough evidence and register for the same with the places they are going to use 
with government authorities. Otherwise they can easily by cameras for personal use without submitting any proof 
documents or doing any extra registrations. At the same time the ownership of the Camera will be updated to the 
buyer and installed with their record in anonymous format. Therefore, buyers are free of paper documentations when 
they need to repair or make claims, etc. on broken or recall camera.  
3.2. Expressing the presence of a working camera  
When purchasing a camera, Camera OTag of those cameras is embedded with purpose attribute and its value. 
Since this is a public attribute, anyone can read it any time without any permission. No one can change it even with 
private access codes.  Due to the nature of the RF communication, when purpose is inquired in an area, the Camera 
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OTags will respond to the query and explain their purpose. For example if reader asks for purposes, each camera 
will respond to the reader with anonymous ID and its purpose like “IEREN244wr9u2”, “PERSONAL USE”. Then it 
is possible to mine data for other verifications. 
3.3. Retrieving availability of installed camera count in a given area 
Using the feature of expressing the purpose of each camera by Camera OTag, how many cameras are installed in 
an area, their purposes, when and how they are working can be checked. Though it is possible to check ether they 
are installed by a personal use, or public safety, some legal workers may use the public safety cameras for wrongful 
acts like changing the projected directions to monitor their personal desires. In such situations, changes to the 
installed cameras also can be monitored while arranging periodical audits. 
3.4. Detecting illegally installed camera 
If there are cameras with personal use installed in a public area, or illegal area can be queried by the portable 
readers or by installed audit readers. This method helps to detect the wrongful use in case the count of cameras 
installed in an area exceed the government approved count or there are cameras installed in susceptible places. 
3.5. Identifying hidden cameras and their initial purpose 
Due to the feature of expressing the purpose of camera, hidden cameras can no longer worked for wrongful acts, 
even by government workers. Therefore the fears’ of general public can be eliminated. Similarly knowing that there 
are cameras installed in that area, whether they are visible or hidden will prevent acting criminal and also abusing of 
the same. 
3.6. Prevent setting cameras in not-allowed area 
Similar to detecting illegal or fake cameras, there must be a solution to detect the availability or using cameras 
inside the toilets, bathroom, etc. This can be achieved by setting a reader to detect the use of cameras and warn users 
when they try to use them.  
Lastly, all video surveillance cameras in public spaces should be registered with an appropriate governmental 
agency to protect people from monitoring by criminals. 
4. Lifecycle of Camera OTag 
Figure 2. Lifecycle Process of Camera OTag. 
As shown in Figure 2, step 1 creates fresh OTags according to the object class. Each class has got different 
attributes as of the real world object.  In this step, the tags contain the attribute names “oName” and “anonymousID”. 
Then the OTag instance for camera class is created in step 2. It contains the attribute names relevant to camera class. 
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Only the values of attribute names “oName” and “anonymous ID” are filled in camera OTag before attaching to a 
camera. The value of “oName” is “CAMERA” and that of “anonymous ID” is a random unique number. Next the 
OTag is passed to the camera manufacturer. 
 Step 3 when camera manufacturers receive the camera OTag instances with empty attribute values except 
“oName” and “anonymousID”. Additionally the private role key and the PIN are set to manufacturers’ secrets. Then, 
all the relevant instance attributes will be fed to the camera OTag instance. For example Canon may request 1000 
camera OTags to attached in brand new cameras and then feed the instance attribute values such as type, purpose, 
etc as shown in Figure 2 step 3.  Then cameras embedded with camera OTag instances are passed to the dealers or 
sellers after transferring the ownership to the dealers. Transferring ownership here works as transferring private key 
and PIN securely in a way without creating any privacy risks or security threats to predecessor or successor. 
In step 4 cameras in dealers possession contains all information fed by the manufacture, but the ownership 
information, role keys and PIN are changed to dealers’ secrets. When a customer bought a brand new camera as in 
step 5, first registration will be carried out. By that time the private role key and PIN will be transferred to the 
customer as ownership information. At the time of purchase, it is necessary to change the purpose filed to “Public-
safety” if the camera is going to be used for public surveillance. For this purpose, the customer has to show evidence 
of proofs and get it registered accordingly. Otherwise the purpose of the camera is set to default value of “Private-
Use”.
Step 6 and step 8 emphasize the usage of the camera. During the usage period customer may change the purpose 
to public surveillance via manufacture by replacing a new OTag. When the customer needs to sell the camera to 
someone, ownership information should be transferred by visiting the authorized center reader.   
In step 9 if the camera may be no longer needed, cancellation of registration can be done in the same centre and 
pass the camera for recycling as shown in step 10. By the time of de-registration only the minimum required 
information will be kept and other information including personal data will be deleted to protect security and 
privacy of users as shown in de-registration tag information in Figure 2. Then the recycling company also can use 
RF communication to improve their process of gathering information on recycling units. 
Note that each user’s ability of writing is also controlled by using three memory types: ROM, EPROM and 
EEPROM.
5. Concluding Remarks 
Due to the miniaturizations and lack of rules and regulations to control the usage of surveillance cameras, 
attempted crimes and abuses using cameras are increasing all over the world. Therefore, this paper proposed a 
solution to prevent such misuse and prevent people from privacy threats while providing them a safety and secure 
society. Our solution can be used to improve efficiency throughout the lifecycle of camera, enable expressing the 
presence of a working cameras, fast, wireless, non-line of sight counting of cameras, prevent installing and using 
cameras illegally, using cameras other than the intended purpose, and using cameras in not-allowed places. 
We strongly believe that through our solution, misusing of cameras including surveillance cameras can be 
eliminated and thereby win the widespread adaptation of same technology to build the privacy friendly society with 
safety and security. 
References 
Chen, D., Chang, Y., Yan, R., & Yang, J. (2007). Tools for protecting the privacy of specific individuals in video. EURASIP Journal on 
Advances in Signal Processing, :Article ID 75427, 9 pages. doi:10.1155/2007/75427. 
Cranor, L. et al. (2002). The platform for privacy preferences 1.0 (p3p1.0) specification. Technical report, World Wide Web Consortium (W3C), 
http://www.w3.org/TR/P3P/ 
Dufaux, Frdric & Ebrahimi, Touradj (2006). Scrambling for video surveillance with privacy. 2006 Conference on Computer Vision and Pattern 
Recognition Workshop (CVPRW’06), 160. 
Electronic Privacy Information Center (2009). http://www.epic.org/privacy/survey. Public Opinion on Privacy. 
Lindell, Yehuda & Pinkas, Benny (2002). Privacy preserving data mining. Journal of Cryptology, 15 (3), 177–206. 
Lioudakis, G. V. et al. (2007). A middleware architecture for privacy protection. Computer Networks: The International Journal of Computer and 
Telecommunications Networking, 51 (16), 4679–4696. 
Sabaragamu Koralalage Krishan and Noriaki Yoshiura / Procedia Social and Behavioral Sciences 2 (2010) 28–35 35
Paruchuri, J., Cheung, S.-C., & Nguyen, T. (2008). Managing privacy information in pervasive camera networks. In Proceedings of IEEE 
International Conference on Image Processing, ICIP 2008. 
Sabaragamu Koralalage, K. & Yoshiura, N. (2009). OTag: Architecture to Represent Real World Objects in RF Tags to improve future Intelligent 
Transportation Systems, Journal of Convergence Information Technology (JCIT), 4 (2), 213-223. 
Solove, D. J. (2004). The Digital Person: Technology and Privacy in the Information Age. New York University Press. 
Wickramasuri, J. et.al. (2004). Privacy protecting data collection in media spaces. ACM Multimedia, 48–55. 
